High court upholds state law against sex trafficking

The Supreme Judicial Court ruled today a 2012 state law that tries to crack down on sex trafficking is constitutional and so two Roxbury pimps got almost everything they deserved as the first two people convicted under it.

The state's highest court ruled that the law had sufficient details of the crimes with which it was concerned and did not violate any federal or state protections against arbitrary prosecution.

In a small victory for one of the two men, Tyshaun McGhee, however, the court ordered his sentence for deriving a profit from prostitution reduced from seven years to five - the maximum the law allows, the court ruled.

The words of the statute have commonly accepted and readily understood meanings in the English language, and the phrase "commercial sexual activity" is amply defined in [the law] The statutory language provided fair notice to the defendants that the very conduct in which they engaged was the kind of conduct that the Legislature intended to prohibit and punish.

The fact that [the law], does not include the element of force or coercion does not render the statute unconstitutionally vague or subject to arbitrary enforcement. The clear and deliberate focus of the statute is the intent of the perpetrator, not the means used by the perpetrator to accomplish his or her intent.

The court also ruled the judge in the case did nothing wrong by blocking testimony or questions about one of the victim's past as a prostitute:

Irrespective of how the defendants have couched their arguments, they seem to be asserting that because C.C. purportedly engaged in prostitution in the past, she effectively consented to the defendants' malfeasance, and the jury should have had the opportunity to consider this evidence. We disagree. As the judge properly determined, the introduction of evidence pertaining to C.C.'s past sexual conduct with others was plainly barred by [state law]. Moreover, as we have discussed, coercion is not an element of the crime of sex trafficking. ... That being the case, it was irrelevant whether C.C. was a willing participant in the defendants' activities. The exclusion of evidence pertaining to C.C.'s alleged history of prostitution had no bearing on whether the defendants violated [the trafficking law], and such exclusion did not prejudice the defendants' cases.