Man's gun charge dismissed because court overcrowding delayed his trial too long

The Massachusetts Appeals Court today dismissed a gun charge out of Roxbury because "court congestion" deprived him of his right to a speedy trial.

Nasahn Davis was arraigned in Roxbury Municipal Court on a charge of illegal gun possession on March 19, 2012. On Mary 31, 2014, 742 days later, his attorney filed a request to dismiss the charge because state law requires a trial within 12 months of an arraignment - excluding time spent dealing with motions to which both sides have agreed.

The Suffolk County District Attorney's office argued that the 159 days that wound up being in question in Davis's case - after excluding delays agreed to by both sides as well as the 365 days allowed by state law for a trial to start - should not count because its prosecutors were ready for trial, even if a judge or jury was not.

But in its ruling, the appeals court argued that justice delayed in this case was justice denied and that delays caused by the courts themselves had to be counted:

Four of the continuances contributing to the delay of the defendant's trial, accounting for 268 days, are attributable to what the parties agree was court congestion. The occasion of each of these four delays was a lack of any or a sufficient number of jurors, but the length of the delays was also due at least in part to the court's calendar constraints.

The court emphasized that its ruling does not necessarily extend to other cases. The justices noted Supreme Judicial Court rulings that "court congestion" by itself is not sufficient reason to include delays caused by it in speedy-trial calculations, and said lawyers have to raise objections at each delay, rather than acquiescing to them. That, they ruled, Davis's lawyer did, even when in one case the reason for a continuance was not really court overcrowding, but snow:

Due to a snow emergency, there were no jurors on January 22, 2014. The defendant objected to a continuance. Both counsel indicated availability the next day or another day. The judge set the matter for trial on April 9, 2014.

The court continued:

While we agree with the principle that the Commonwealth should not be unfairly penalized for delay when it also was ready for trial, this does not end the inquiry where, as here, the defendant zealously guarded his right to a speedy trial. We do not hold that all congestion-related delays to which a defendant objects will necessarily be counted against the Commonwealth in all circumstances; rather, where the defendant objects to the delay and did not cause, acquiesce to, or benefit from the delay, rule 36 [which deals with setting court dates] constrains the Commonwealth to justify the delay under an exception to rule 36 in order for the time to be excluded from the rule 36 calculation.