

Exhibit A

The Cambridge District Court of
The Commonwealth of Massachusetts

_____)
Xianwen Liu)

Plaintiff)

v.)

Docket Number:

The Harvard University Press)

2452CV0244

Defendant)
_____)

Customer Complaint Against The Harvard University Press For
Violation My First and Fourteenth Amerndment

1. Plaintiff, Xianwen Liu, 5 Concord Ave. #5, Cambridge, MA
02138. 617-201-4506. ltrjefferson@hotmail.com

2. Defendant, The Harvard University Press, 79 Garden Street,
Cambridge, MA 02138. 617-495-2600

3. I am a customer who had bought, on May 13, 2024, Mr. Ezra
Vogel's Deng Xiaoping and the Transformation of China which is

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CLERK'S OFFICE
MAY 15 A 10:13

published by the Harvard University Press in 2011.

4. It's alleged that Mr. Ezra Vogel's Deng Xiaoping had sold out more than 1 million copies in the greater China area. And it's a highly influential and definitive biography.

5. As a reader and researcher, I had discovered that the author, Mr. Ezra Vogel had made a Grave Error about the so-called Zhuhai meeting in his narrative of Deng Xiaoping, the former paramount Chinese leader from 1978 to 1997. (See details in the supporting evidences)

6. I had done a comprehensive and deep research upon that Grave Error. And I had consulted with a few experts in that field. All the feedbacks are the same that that Grave Error is REAL and my claim has convincing weights.

7. That Grave Error could have been deemed as a a libel or a defamation to Mr. Deng Xiaoping.

8. If that Grave Error is left untouched and uncorrected, it will not only continue to mislead readers, but also, and might be

more important, it will harm the reputations of Mr. Ezra Vogel, the Harvard University Press and Mr. Deng Xiaoping

9. My **statement of claim** is clearly that the Harvard University Press should launch a peer-review about the Grave Error which I think Mr. Ezra Vogel had made. And if that error is proved, the Harvard University Press should have issued either a Correction or an Erratum.

10. I had mailed in early April this year to the Harvard University Press, asking her to launch a peer-review and issue a correction. I had also emailed her again for the same demand in May this year. Unfortunately, the Harvard University Press has completely ignored me, and not even condescended to contact with me.

11. The Harvard University Press' responds had really hurt me, as either a reader or a customer.

12. As a book customer, I think that I have the right given by the First Amendment and the Fourteenth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution to ask the publisher or the author to correct a

Grave Error.

13. The author, Mr. Ezra Vogel had died in 2020.

14. My **request for relief** is simply. If it please the court, the court shall issue an injunction to the Harvard University Press. And accordingly, the Harvard University should launch a peer-review about the Grave Error which I think Mr. Ezra Vogel had made. And if that error is proved, the Harvard University Press should have issued a correction or an erretum

15. Plaintiff demands trial by jury on all issues properly so tried.

STATEMENT OF DAMAGES G.L. c. 218, § 19A(a)	DOCKET NO. <i>2452CV0244</i>	Trial Court of Massachusetts
PLAINTIFF(S) <i>Xianwen Liu</i>	DATE FILED <i>May 15, 2024</i>	
DEFENDANT(S) <i>The Harvard University Press</i>	COURT DIVISION Cambridge District Court	

INSTRUCTIONS: THIS FORM MUST BE COMPLETED AND FILED WITH THE COMPLAINT OR OTHER INITIAL PLEADING IN ALL DISTRICT AND BOSTON MUNICIPAL COURT CIVIL ACTIONS SEEKING MONEY DAMAGES.

Required information to be submitted by Filer (select applicable boxes):
 Civil action alleges money damages in: Contract Tort

TORT CLAIMS	AMOUNT
A. Documented medical expenses to date:	
1. Total hospital expenses:	\$ _____
2. Total doctor expenses:	\$ _____
3. Total chiropractic expenses:	\$ _____
4. Total physical therapy expenses:	\$ _____
5. Total other expenses (describe) _____	\$ _____
SUBTOTAL:	\$ _____
B. Documented lost wages and compensation to date:	\$ _____
C. Documented property damages to date:	\$ _____
D. Reasonably anticipated future medical and hospital expenses:	\$ _____
E. Reasonable anticipated lost wages:	\$ _____
F. Other documented items of damage (describe): _____	\$ _____
G. Brief description of Plaintiff's injury, including nature and extent of injury: _____	\$ _____
For this form, disregard double or treble damage claims; indicate single damages only.	TOTAL: \$ _____

2024 MAY 15 A 10:13
 CAMBRIDGE DISTRICT COURT
 CLERK'S OFFICE

CONTRACT CLAIMS	AMOUNT
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This action includes a claim involving collection of a debt incurred pursuant to a revolving credit agreement
 Mass. R. Civ. P. 8.1(a)

Provide a detailed description of the claim(s): *The Harvard University Press has violated my right as a book customer protected by the 1st & 14th Amendment. I demand her to issue a correction and award me \$25,000.*

For this form, disregard double or treble damage claims; indicate single damages only. **TOTAL:** \$ *25,000*

Alleged total damages are (select appropriate box): \$25,000 or less more than \$25,000

ATTORNEY FOR PLAINTIFF (OR UNREPRESENTED PLAINTIFF) PRINT OR TYPE NAME: <i>Xianwen Liu</i> DATE: _____ SIGNATURE: <i>Xianwen Liu</i> B.B.O. #: _____ ADDRESS: <i>5 Concord Ave #5 Cambridge MA 02138</i>	DEFENDANT'S NAME AND ADDRESS: <i>The Harvard University Press</i> <i>79 Garden Street</i> <i>Cambridge, MA 02138</i>
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CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO SJC RULE 1:18: I hereby certify that I have complied with requirements of Rule 5 of the Supreme Judicial Court Uniform Rules on Dispute Resolution (SJC Rule 1:18) requiring that I provide my clients with information about court-connected dispute resolution services and discuss with them the advantages and disadvantages of the various methods of dispute resolution.

Signature of Attorney on Record: _____ Date: _____

Details for Order #111-9465139-1592242

Print this page for your records.

Order Placed: May 13, 2024
Amazon.com order number: 111-9465139-1592242
Order Total: USD 30.90

Preparing for Shipment

Items Ordered

Price

1 of: *Deng Xiaoping and the Transformation of China*, Vogel, Ezra F.

\$22.50

Sold by: Amazon.com Services, Inc

Supplied by: Other

Condition: New

Shipping Address:

JeffersonLiu2022
5 CONCORD AVE APT 5
CAMBRIDGE, MA 02138-3633
United States

Shipping Speed:

Standard Shipping

Payment information

Payment Method:

Mastercard ending in 9271

Billing address

JeffersonLiu2022
5 CONCORD AVE APT 5
CAMBRIDGE, MA 02138-3633
United States

Item(s) Subtotal: USD 22.50

Shipping & Handling: USD 6.99

Total before tax: USD 29.49

Estimated tax to be collected: USD 1.41

Grand Total: USD 30.90

Payment Grand Total: CNY 228.43

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A Grave Error in Vogel's Deng Xiaoping

Summary

Ezra Vogel's *Deng Xiaoping and the Transformation of China* (was acclaimed as "this comprehensive, minutely documented book" by Mr. Jonathan Mirsky¹. Since its publication in 2011, many articles had megered, debating about its historic accuracies and its fundamental point of views.

My debate is focused upon the so-called Zhuhai meeting. My main point is that the Zhuhai Meeting had not occurred at all. Even if, it had happened, Vogel's description is wrongly, and his supporting documents are skimpsy.

And this is not a little error. It's grave, because that it had belittled Deng's leadership at least, not to say it's closed to either defamation or libel.

Article

¹ How Deng Did It, an article of the New York Times, by Jonathan Mirsky, October 21, 2011.

Vogel claims that “In Zhuhai, Deng held a meeting ostensibly for military planning that turned up the heat under Jiang Zeming.²”

At that time, Deng, who’d nominally retired from the leadership in 1989, but was still the undisputed true boss of China, was touring in the South China, and holding many chats and talks with the local party leaders. Deng’s purpose is clearly, warning the conservatives section within the party, probably represented by Li Peng³, and pushing them to accelerate the reform.

Vogel further claims that “The meeting Deng attended in Zhuhai on ‘military planning’ was chaired by Qiao Shi, one of the six members of the Standing Committee of the Politburo.⁴”

² Vogel, Ezra F. *Deng Xiaoping and the Transformation of China*. Cambridge, Massachusetts. The Harvard University Press, 2011. p. 677

³ Gilley, Bruce. *Tiger on the brink: Jiang Zemin and China’s new elite*. Berkeley, University of California Press. 1988. p.185.

“While he was in the South, Deng’s anger was mostly vented on Li Peng.”

⁴ *Ibid*, p.667

Qiao Shi was at that time the secretary of the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection (CCDI), and also the secretary of the Central Political and Legal Affairs Commission (CPLC).

Why Qiao Shi, whose responsibilities are outside the military affair, can hold a military meeting? Vogel explains that “Since Qiao Shi was in charge of domestic security matters, it was appropriate for him to call such a meeting.”⁵ Vogel’s argument here is weak. The domestic security and “the military planning” are totally in the different areas. In China, the military affairs are highly exclusively. And Vogel has not provided any convincing documents to support it.

There are three second sources Vogel had presented in the part of the Notes to support the so-called Zhuhai Meeting. Among them, it’s only James A. Miles’s works had mentioned Qiao Shi. But the difference between Miles and Vogel is huge and conspicuously.

“There he [Deng] met Qiao Shi, one of the six members of

⁵ Ibid, p. 667

the Politburo's Standing Committee and the man responsible for overseeing domestic security, who had been chairing a conference in Zhuhai on security issues.⁶

Miles'd never directly mentioned or indirectly implied the "military planning" meeting which Qiao Shi had called and chaired as Vogel described.

It's highly possible that Deng had given talks to Qiao Shi, joined by "President Yang Shang kun, vice chairman of teh Central Military Commission (CMC); General Liu Huaqing, another vice chairman of the CMC; and Yang Shangkun's half-brother General Yang Baibing, who was head of the PLA Political Work Department and secretary general of the CMC."⁷

Could Deng, the real boss, let Qiao Shi to call and chair a military meeting when the three highest-ranking military brasses had presented? I don't think so. Qiao Shi might have participated such a meeting if it's indeed happened. But, it's

⁶ Miles, James A. *The Legacy of Tiananmen: China in Disarray*. Ann Arbor, The University of Michigan Press.1997. p. 95

⁷ Vogel, Ezra F. *Deng Xiaoping and the Transformation of China*. Cambridge, Massachusetts. The Harvard University Press, 2011. p. 677

against nearly all the party rules and protocols for Qiao Shi to call and chair a military meeting.

And it's needless to add that the nominal chairman of the CMC at that time, Jiang Zemin had not participated the so-called Zhuhai meeting. According to Vogel's narrative, Jiang had not even known about the so-called Zhuhai meeting before it had happened at all. It's so weird. And it's conflicting with other sources⁸.

So the most highly scenario is that Vogel had confused the domestic security meeting Qiao Shi had chaired with the small group chats given by Deng, and joined by Yang Shangkun, Liu Huaqing, Yang Baibing and others.

Vogel has acknowledged that "The Zhuhai meeting is not mentioned in books on the southern tour published in

⁸ "Jiang had almost certainly been formed about Deng's trip before the patriarch' train chugged out of Beijing Station. One official account says "Key organs" knew about the trip, a phrase that would almost certainly have included Jiang, since he was mostly on Deng's side in the 1991 debates over economic reforms."

Gilley, Bruce. Tiger on the brink: Jiang Zemin and China's new elite. Berkeley, University of California Press. 1988. p.185.

mainland China, nor is it noted in the official chronology of Deng's life, Deng Xiaoping nianpu.⁹”

And the Deng Xiaoping nianpu has never recorded a single meeting during the period from he had participated a meeting at his residence on November 4th, 1989 to his death on February 19, 1997. That meeting is an enlarged meeting of the Politburo Standing Committee (PSC) of the CCP. It seems that that meeting is relevant with Deng's decision to resign as the chairman of the CMC in the coming of the 5th plenary meeting of the 13th Central Committee of the CCP in November 6-9,1989¹⁰.

Vogel has explained that “This omission is understandable, for Communist Party leaders do not want inner-party tensions to be revealed in public.” It's true that the party unity, at least publically, is one of the top priorities of the CCP. But, since the so-called Zhuhai meeting had not been recorded in the most authoritative official document, is it not right for Vogel to be more cautiously in addressing this serious topic?

⁹ Ibid, p.677

¹⁰ Deng Xiaoping Nianpo, Beijing, The Central Literature Publishing House, 2004. p.1294-1381. In Chinese language. I am not aware of any English transtion.

Since the three main sources Vogel had referred in the Notes had not written the so-called Zhuhai meeting, so from where did Vogel get his idea? He explained that, “But news of the meeting leaked from participants and from observers in Zhuhai and was, in effect, confirmed by the reactions of Jiang Zemin in the weeks following the meeting.¹¹”

To the leaks from the participants and the observers, Vogel has not given any further details. It's true that Vogel interviewed many figures which had shown in the long Preface, includes the two daughters of Deng, and even Jiang Zemin himself. But it's hard to know the details of these interviews, especially whether or not Vogel had raised the questions of the so-called Zhuhai meeting. And there's no signs, direct or indirect, in either the narrative or the notes that had shown evidences or that Vogel had done that.

So academically, it's not enough to be convincing.

The only further explanation Vogel had presented is Jiang

¹¹ Ibid, p. 677

Zemin's reponds. However, Vogel's narrative is full of historic errors and faked informations here.

"Jiang Zemin, eager to get precise news of the Zhuhai meeting, persuaded Jia Qinglin, first party secretary of Fujian, to give him a tape of the meeting; not long thereafter it was announced that Jia Qinglin had been appointed to the Politburo.¹²"

First, there's no such title of "first Party Secretary of Fujian" in 1992; second, the party secretary of Fujian at that time is Mr. Chen Guangyi who'd served as the party secretary of Fujian from 1986 to 1993; third, Jia Qinglin, Jiang's long confidant and colleague in the Frist Ministry of Machine Industry, was deputy party secretary and Governor of Fujian at 1992; fourth, Jia had entered the Polituro in 1997, not "NOT LONG thereafter it was announced that Jia Qinglin had been appointed to the Politburo," as Vogel wrote. The 5 years gap between 1992 to 1997 is absolutely not "NOT LONG thereafter."The fourth error is probably one of the most fatals.

¹² Ibid, P.677

Vogel's explanation in the part of "Jiang Zemin's responds" had raised even more questions.

First, how and why Jia have the tape?

Jia was merely a deputy party secretary and governor of a local province, Fujian. Did Jia participate the so-called Zhuhai Meeting? It seems that he did not. So, why did and how can he get the tape of such a highest-level and secret "military" meeting?

Second, why did Jiang ask Jia to help?

Jiang was the General Secretary of CCP and the Chairman of CMC at that time. Why did not Jiang ask the tape through the official channels, like the General Office of the CCP or the General Office of the CMC?

It looks counterintuitively and weird if it's true. Actually, it's not true. Because the whole spin of the so-called Zhuhai Meeting is not true as Vogel had limned.

Conclusion

Featured by perforated narratives, flimsy supporting archives, inconvincing evidences, I choose to believe that the so-called Zhuhai meeting had not yet happened as Vogel had limned.

Meanwhile, Vogel's narrative had not been echoed by any other prominent historians in the field of the Chinese studies. Robert L. Kuhn, the author of *The Man Who Changed China* which was consulted by Vogel, held a high esteem on Bruce Gilley and his works. "Bruce Gilley's pioneering well-researched bogprahy, *Tiger on the Brink: Jiang Zemin and the New Elite* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1999), is an important source from which I have drawn and to which future biographers will certainly refer."¹³ However, Gilley had not mentioned or imply the so-called Zhuhai meeting in his narrative of Deng Xiaoping's South China tour in 1992¹⁴.

¹³ Kuhn, Robert Lawrence. *The Man Who Changed China: The Life and Legacy of Jiang Zemin*. New York, Crown Publisher. 2004. p. 686

¹⁴ Gilley, Bruce. *Tiger on the brink: Jiang Zemin and China's new elite*. Berkeley, University of California Press. 1988. p.183-187

My conclusion is that there's no such Zhuhai meeting as Vogel had narrated, an official meeting, called and chaired by Qiao Shi, joined by Deng Xiaoping, Yang Shangkun, Liu Huaqing, Yang Baibing and others, but absented by Jiang Zemin. And the Zhuhai chat which Deng talked with Qiao Shi and others highest-ranking military brasses in a small group conversation style and gave some decrees had existed.

I have accommodated no one ounce disrespect to Prof. Vogel. My doubt and debate is merely and all academically. I appreciate that Vogel's purpose to further the mutual understanding between our two countries. And that's what I am doing now, trying to correct an grave error in a great book.

As the motto of Harvard tells us, Truth makes us free.

Appendix I

Deng Xiaoping
and the
Transformation
of China

EZRA F. VOGEL

THE BELKNAP PRESS OF HARVARD UNIVERSITY PRESS
Cambridge, Massachusetts, and London, England 2011

Appendix I

In Zhuhai, Deng held a meeting ostensibly for military planning that turned up the heat under Jiang Zemin. He repeated the message he gave in Wuhan: "Whoever is opposed to reform must leave office. . . . Our leaders look like they're doing something, but they're not doing anything worthwhile."⁴¹ The meeting Deng attended in Zhuhai on "military planning" was chaired by Qiao Shi, one of the six members of the Standing Committee of the Politburo. Since Qiao Shi was in charge of domestic security matters, it was appropriate for him to call such a meeting. But Qiao Shi was also regarded by many as having the qualities needed to be a top leader and as a potential rival to Jiang Zemin, so this meeting had the potential to be about China's leadership. Even more ominously for Jiang, attending the meeting were President Yang Shangkun, vice chairman of the Central Military Commission (CMC); General Liu Huaqing, another vice chairman of the CMC; and Yang Shangkun's half brother General Yang Baibing, who was head of the PLA Political Work Department and secretary general of the CMC. Although all these officials were concerned with security, they also all agreed with Deng about the need to speed up reform.⁴²

The Zhuhai meeting is not mentioned in books on the southern tour published in mainland China, nor is it noted in the official chronology of Deng's life, *Deng Xiaoping nianpu*. This omission is understandable, for Communist Party leaders do not want inner-party tensions to be revealed in public. But news of the meeting leaked from participants and from observers in Zhuhai and was, in effect, confirmed by the reactions of Jiang Zemin in the weeks following the meeting. The strong representation of military leaders made it clear that if necessary, the high-level military brass was willing to support a new leader.

Jiang Zemin Responds

Jiang Zemin, eager to get precise news of the Zhuhai meeting, persuaded Jia Qinglin, first party secretary of Fujian, to give him a tape of the meeting; not long thereafter it was announced that Jia Qinglin had been appointed to the Politburo. And although it was not customary for Jiang to phone Deng on New Year's, on February 3, 1992, five days after Deng left Zhuhai, Jiang Zemin phoned Deng to wish him a happy New Year. As Jiang later acknowledged, the phone call was no accident.⁴³ Jiang thereafter began to tilt more boldly toward reform.

Deng arrived in Shanghai on January 31 for three more weeks of vacation, when at a more leisurely pace than in the SEZs he viewed Pudong's develop-

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Notes to Pages 670-677

18. Tong Huaiping and Li Chengguan, *Deng Xiaoping baci nancun jishi*, p. 226.
19. *Ibid.*, p. 226. The comment is from a talk delivered on February 29, 1980.
20. *Ibid.*, pp. 227-228.
21. *Ibid.*, pp. 228-229.
22. Interview with Chen Kaizhi, who accompanied Deng on the trip, and other local officials, October 2003.
23. Tong Huaiping and Li Chengguan, *Deng Xiaoping baci nancun jishi*, pp. 231-232.
24. *Ibid.*, p. 243.
25. Miles, *Legacy of Tiananmen*, pp. 96-97.
26. Interview in October 2003 with Chen Kaizhi, who was deputy secretary general of Guangdong at the time of the Deng visit and responsible for making the arrangements for the trip to Shenzhen and Zhuhai. See also Cen Longye, ed., *Yucui wujia* (Priceless Experience and Love) (Beijing: Zuojia chubanshe, 2001), pp. 182-190. Figures about cameras and tape recorders are from Zhao, "Deng Xiaoping's Southern Tour," 750. For another account of the trip see Huang Hong, *Ying daoli*, pp. 150-190.
27. Tong Huaiping and Li Chengguan, *Deng Xiaoping baci nancun jishi*, pp. 234-235.
28. Interview with an official who rode with Deng, November 2003, in Guangzhou.
29. *SWDXP-3*, pp. 362-363.
30. Tong Huaiping and Li Chengguan, *Deng Xiaoping baci nancun jishi*, p. 232; Kuhn, *The Man Who Changed China*, p. 212.
31. Tong Huaiping and Li Chengguan, *Deng Xiaoping baci nancun jishi*, pp. 240, 245-246.
32. *Ibid.*, pp. 232-233.
33. *Ibid.*, pp. 246-248.
34. Cen Longye, *Yucui wujia*, p. 186.
35. Tong Huaiping and Li Chengguan, *Deng Xiaoping baci nancun jishi*, pp. 248-249.
36. *Ibid.*, pp. 251-253.
37. *DXPNP-2*, January 29, 1992.
38. Tong Huaiping and Li Chengguan, *Deng Xiaoping baci nancun jishi*, pp. 279-282.
39. Miles, *Legacy of Tiananmen*, p. 95.
40. *Ibid.*, p. 95; Zhao, "Deng Xiaoping's Southern Tour," 749; Tong Huaiping and Li Chengguan, *Deng Xiaoping baci nancun jishi*, p. 286.
41. Kuhn, *The Man Who Changed China*, pp. 212-213.
42. Miles, *Legacy of Tiananmen*, pp. 95-96; Zhao, "Deng Xiaoping's Southern Tour," 749; Kuhn, *The Man Who Changed China*, p. 213.

Appendix II

**The
Legacy of
Tiananmen**

China in Disarray

James A. R. Miles

Ann Arbor

THE UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN PRESS

Appendix II*The Deng Whirlwind* 95

Analyzing the reasons for Deng's trip to the south, a Beijing-controlled journal in Hong Kong noted that "some people were using Mao Zedong to oppose Deng Xiaoping and raise the ghost of leftism."³⁸ Chinese journalists I spoke to speculated that Deng felt personally alighted by the publicity surrounding Mao and wanted to counter it with a mini personality cult of his own. He may always have been a strong critic of personality cults but probably better, he felt, that he be the object of one than Mao, who represented so much of what he was trying to change in China.

The first hint of Deng's trip in a national newspaper did not appear until February 3rd in the English-language *China Daily*, more than two weeks after Deng arrived in Shenzhen. *China Daily's* coverage consisted merely of a photograph of a smiling, gray-haired Deng and Yang Shangkun in Shenzhen's botanical gardens, together with a brief caption that gave no indication of when the photograph was taken. On the evening of the same day, Chinese television broadcast an 80-second clip of Deng Xiaoping mingling among guests at a Lunar New Year party in Shanghai filmed just a few hours earlier. It was Deng's first televised appearance since his trip to Shanghai in 1991. But the television report did not even mention Deng's tour of Shenzhen. Nor did it quote any of Deng's remarks beyond saying that he had extended his Spring Festival greetings to the people of Shanghai. To many Chinese viewers who already knew of Deng's trip from foreign radio broadcasts it looked bizarre indeed.

Four days later a Canton newspaper carried a brief report on the Shenzhen visit based on an article published by the Beijing-controlled *Ta Kung Pao* in Hong Kong.³⁹ But the national press ignored it. The floodgates did not burst until late March, when first a Shenzhen newspaper and finally national newspapers and television carried detailed original accounts of what Deng had said and done three months earlier.

Deng spent five days in Shenzhen before taking a boat with his family and entourage to Zhuhai on the other side of the Pearl River estuary next to the Portuguese enclave of Macao. There he met Qiao Shi, one of the six members of the Politburo's Standing Committee and the man responsible for overseeing domestic security, who had been chairing a conference in Zhuhai on security issues. At the conference, Qiao had delivered a strong message of support for Deng, arguing that the SEZs "should also be pacesetters in political reform" and that "Marxism should not be regarded as a doctrine."⁴⁰ Also in Zhuhai was the 75-year-old General Liu Huaqing, a vice chairman of the Central Military Com-

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mission who had accompanied Deng in Shenzhen as well. Yang Shangkun, who had left Deng in Shenzhen to make a side trip to Canton, rejoined the group in Zhuhai. It was a gathering of the key men needed by Deng to wage his battle against the conservatives:

Deng spent a week in Zhuhai before boarding his train again for Shanghai. En route to Shanghai he stopped for less than an hour in Canton where he addressed dozens of provincial and city officials at the railway station, telling them, in his old catchphrase, to engage in "less empty talk."⁴¹ On February 21st, after three weeks in Shanghai, Deng abandoned his train and flew back to Beijing.

"The Deng whirlwind," as the Chinese media later dubbed Deng's travels, proved to be a pivotal point in the history of the reform era. Deng's supporters hoped it would be the political act that he would be remembered for after his death rather than the decision to order troops to open fire in 1989. Shuffling slowly round Shenzhen and Zhuhai, supported by one of his daughters—whose duty was to repeat every word said to him in a loud voice—Deng bore no resemblance to a whirlwind. Although the Beijing-controlled media in Hong Kong kept stressing how healthy Deng looked and how good his memory seemed, their reports suggested that he was sometimes more of an absentminded professor than a fiery politician. "It is said that in Xianhu botanical garden, when the city party committee leader asked Deng Xiaoping to stay a few more days in Shenzhen, Deng did not answer directly," reported the *Wen Wei Po*. "When Deng was taking a walk in the guest house, the city leader again invited him to visit Shenzhen another time, he still did not reply and seemed lost in thought. After taking a few steps, he turned around and said 'You should speed up your pace.'"⁴²

But slow of movement and hard of hearing though Deng clearly was, he kept up a punishing schedule, touring parks, receiving briefings, visiting factories, and expounding his views in off-the-cuff homilies to those around him. Most of his remarks must have been enormously encouraging to the officials he met, but not all of his advice was heeded. During a visit to the Xianke Laser Company, a leading manufacturer of laser video and compact discs, the near deaf Deng expressed delight with a karaoke performance put on by company managers. "Very good. I could hear clearly. The sound effects are also good," he said.⁴³ But Deng had clearly been briefed on Guangdong's notoriety as a center of pirate compact disc production. "What about the copyright?" he asked. The company director, Ye Huaming, the son of a famous communist general who died during the civil war, assured Deng that copyrights were bought from foreign

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22. Fang "Zuo" *Beiwanglu*, op. cit., 438.

23. The exact date of Deng's departure is not given in official accounts.

24. *Dachao Xinqi: Deng Xiaoping Nanxun Qianqian Houhou*, edited by Yu Xiguang, Li Liangdong et al. (Beijing: Zhongguo Guangbo Dianshi Chubanshe, 1992), 181-82. Chinese sources told me that this account of Deng's southern tour and its aftermath, known in English as *Renaissance of the Spring Tide: The Inside Story of Deng's Southern Tour*, was also attacked by hard-liners who ordered bookshops not to stock it on the grounds that it contained typographical errors. The sources said the book's contents, however, were based mainly on information provided by Deng's office.

25. Fang "Zuo" *Beiwanglu*, op. cit., 107.

26. Zhongguo Tongxun She, November 25th, 1990. SWB FE/0932/B2.

27. Xinhua News Agency, July 22nd, 1992. SWB FE/1445/B2.

28. See "Make a Success of Special Economic Zones and Open More Cities to the Outside World," *Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping*, vol. 3, 61-62. Deng says of the proposed new open cities, "We wouldn't call them SEZs, but policies similar to those in the zones could be pursued there."

29. "Dongfang Feng Lai Man Yan Chun: Deng Xiaoping Tongzhi zai Shenzhen Jishi," *Shenzhen Tequ Bao*, March 26th, 1992. No foreign reporters were on hand to witness the scene.

30. *Ming Pao*, January 21st, 1992. SWB FE/1286/B2.

31. SWB FE/1285/B2.

32. For example, *Dachao Xinqi: Deng Xiaoping Nanxun Qianqian Houhou*, op. cit., 105-24, and "Deng Xiaoping Wei He Chongzhen Fan 'Zuo?'" in the Beijing-controlled Hong Kong magazine *Bauhinia* (April 1992).

33. *Dachao Xinqi*, op. cit., 107.

34. *Ibid.*

35. *Ibid.*, 106.

36. Zhongguo Tongxun She, September 6th, 1991. SWB FE/1172/B2.

37. *Guangming Ribao*, November 26th, 1991. SWB FE/1260/B2.

38. "Deng Xiaoping Wei He Chongzhen Fan 'Zuo?'" *Bauhinia*, April 1992.

39. *Yangcheng Wanbao*, February 7th, 1992. SWB FE/1310/B2.

40. Xinhua News Agency, January 28th, 1992. SWB FE/1291/B2.

41. *Wen Wei Po*, January 31st, 1992. SWB FE/1292/B2. In his closing address at the 11th Party Congress in August 1977, when he was engaged in a struggle with Maoists led by Hua Guofeng, the then party vice chairman Deng Xiaoping had similarly told delegates, "there must be less empty talk and more hard work."

42. *Wen Wei Po*, January 28th, 1992. SWB FE/1290/B2.

43. *Shenzhen Tequ Bao*, March 26th, 1992. SWB FE/1345/B2.

44. *Wen Wei Po*, February 14th, 1992. SWB FE/1306/B2.

45. *Ibid.*

46. *Wen Wei Po*, January 28th, 1992. SWB FE/1290/B2.

Appendix III

The Man Who Changed China

The Life and Legacy of Jiang Zemin

ROBERT LAWRENCE KUHN



Crown Publishers / New York

Appendix III

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THE MAN WHO CHANGED CHINA

At his first stop in Wuhan, Deng got right to the point. "Here's what our problem is right now," he said when Hubei provincial leaders met him at the train station (in his private railroad car). "Our leaders look like they're doing something, but they're not doing anything really worthwhile. When I watch television, all I see are meetings and ceremonies. Our leaders must think they're television stars." In a verbal message, sent through the Hubei Party chief, to the Central Committee in Beijing, Deng drew a line in the sand. "Anyone who is against reform," he warned, "will be put out of his office." Deng was contesting for the soul of the Party; this time he was not turning back.

Jiang was shocked. Although long recognizing the need to reform, he believed in socialism's core tenets of state ownership and central planning and he generally agreed with his conservative colleagues that reforms should be measured and unhurried. Now he was conflicted and uncertain: Jiang Zemin was at a crossroads.

Two days later Jiang told officials that the whole Party should "liberate their thoughts" and quicken the steps of reform and the open-door policy. "We have to greatly develop advanced technology and promote economic construction with one heart and one mind." He stressed that it was imperative to "aggressively cut back nonessential meetings and reduce excessive routine functions."

Just days before Deng departed, Jiang had urged Shanghai to "accelerate reform and opening to the outside world" and "take new steps in deepening reforms." A week later he called on Party cadres to be honest and frugal in order to build trust among the masses. "We have to change the working style of the leadership at various levels," he said.

In Shenzhen, a birthplace of China's economic miracle, Deng spoke to an enthusiastic crowd. "The success of Shenzhen clearly proves there was no need to worry whether we are following 'socialism' or 'capitalism.' Only suspicious people raise the question and they are self-defeated. From now on, we should increase foreign investment, form more joint ventures, and take advantage of Western technology and management. Don't worry! Some critics think that we may sink into capitalism sooner or later, but they have no common sense.

"These [foreign joint venture] firms make profits under our law, pay taxes, and provide our workers with jobs and pay," Deng added. "What's wrong with that?" He warned, "If we don't continue to improve people's living standard,

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if we don't continue to build the economy, there will only be a dead-end road for our Party."

Upon his departure, Deng addressed the Shenzhen Party secretary publicly, saying, "You must speed up development!" It was an astonishing statement. Nowhere else in China was reform moving as fast as it was in Shenzhen. Critics in Beijing often pointed to the city as a case study of what happens when reform moves *too* fast. Now Deng was telling Shenzhen leaders to move even faster. He took up a metaphor used by Mao: "We must not act like women with bound feet," he said.

"Certainly we must watch that we don't deviate to the Right," Deng said at his next stop in Zhuhai. "But deviating to the Left is an even greater danger that we must prevent." He again called for opponents of reform to step down—a remark that cut a wide swath. Some thought Deng was targeting Li Peng, who as premier was in charge of the economy. Others claimed Jiang Zemin was not exempt, even though he had been speaking out vigorously for reform. "Whoever is against reform," Deng repeated, "will be driven out of power."

But Deng was even-handed. "The present central leadership," he said, using the code phrase for Jiang Zemin, "has done a good job . . . Of course," he added, "there are still many problems, but problems exist at any time."

~~In Guangdong, Deng was met by his old comrade-in-arms, President Yang Shangkun, and his power-minded brother, General Yang Baibing. The Yang brothers came to "escort and protect the emperor" [Deng], backing Deng's stance on reform and hoping to set themselves apart from those in Beijing. Could Deng's frustration mean he might change the central leadership? If such rumors ever materialized, the Yang brothers wanted to be close by.~~

As Deng's train rolled across southern China, and the Paramount Leader kept speaking out bluntly, the mainland media's silence became problematic. ~~Hong Kong reporters were tailing Deng all along his route, capturing every comment, but not a single item appeared in any mainland paper. Some decision on high had been made to suppress the big news.~~

Uncertain of where Deng's Southern Tour would lead, no one in Beijing wanted to get trapped in a definitive position. ~~Yet word of his travels and incisive commentary was becoming widespread, and the awkward absence of press was causing senior leadership to lose credibility. (While the Politburo agreed on February 12 to allow a limited dissemination of Deng's remarks to senior officials—hoping that Deng would be satisfied and his ideas~~



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Advancing Knowledge, Driving Change

Deng Xiaoping's Southern Tour: Elite Politics in Post-Tiananmen China

Author(s): Suisheng Zhao

Source: *Asian Survey*, Aug., 1993, Vol. 33, No. 8 (Aug., 1993), pp. 739-756

Published by: University of California Press

Stable URL: <https://www.jstor.org/stable/2645086>

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Appendix IV



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Appendix IV

"moderates and reformists"—as they are called by the overseas media—took an equivocal position or were slow to adopt a position at all. Local Shanghai leaders could do little but stay aloof from the battle.

At Chinese New Year 1992, Deng Xiaoping revisited Shanghai and launched the "second northern expedition." Relative to the previous effort, the radius and line for this offensive was extended. In 1991 Shanghai courageously fought the battle alone; this time Deng allied it with Guangdong. Moreover, in 1992 he received firm support from the military.²⁵ In order to make his position clear, Deng strongly affirmed his support for the Huang Fuping articles: "These articles are well written and the points they made are all correct. I heard that some people wanted to investigate the background of these articles. If they continue to do this, just tell them that I requested these articles and I made the points. Let them investigate me."²⁶ Moreover, while he was in Shanghai, *Jiefang Ribao* received a photo of Deng Xiaoping taken in Shenzhen's Xianhu Botanical Garden by Yang Shaoming, son of Yang Shangkun, and printed it on February 15 on its front page. In its weekend section on the same day, "Yang Shaoming's New Photographic Creations," reflecting Deng's activities, were given a full-page display. Obviously, *Jiefang Ribao* had been greatly favored, and prudent Chinese politicians quickly realized this meant that Deng and Yang had both commanded and supported the newspaper.

The "public opinion" favoring reform and opening up sought by Deng's southern China trip first appeared in Shanghai, then Shenzhen, and finally Beijing. On February 4 *Jiefang Ribao* carried a front-page article by Wen Qi that praised Deng's advocacy of emancipation of the mind. It had characteristics similar to the Huang Fuping articles, quoting passage by passage Deng Xiaoping's remarks during his visits to Shenzhen, Zhuhai, and Shanghai.²⁷ Then, Shanghai's other major daily, *Wenhui Bao*, carried

25. Powerful military support was manifested mainly in the fact that Yang Shangkun and CMC General Secretary Yang Baibing took a clear-cut stand in support of Deng. It was reported that in November 1991, after *Renmin Ribao* published an editorial, "Is Reform Socialist or Capitalist in Nature?," and openly contradicted the directive and criticism by Li Ruihuan, Yang Shangkun personally queried the newspaper about its intentions. Moreover, at the All-Army Political Work Conference in September 1991, presided over by Yang Baibing, concurrently director of the army's General Political Department, opposition to "peaceful evolution" was not listed as a main agenda topic, although the question of how the Chinese armed forces would meet an emergency after the Soviet coup was discussed. *Ming Pao*, March 6, 1992.

26. *Ching Pao*, March 5, 1992.

27. For instance, using Deng's original words, it said: "We have only implemented the line mapped out since the 3rd Plenary Session of the 11th CPC Central Committee for just over 10 years and great achievements have already been made. If we continue to do the same

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a commentator's article on February 8 entitled "Upholding One Center." Using Deng's original words directed at Chen Yun's "another center," it stressed that "there is only one party center, and that is taking economic construction as the center. Apart from this, there is no other center."

Following in the footsteps of the Shanghai press, *Shenzhen Tequ Bao*, published four articles in February under the title "Year of the Monkey Commentary," summarizing the ideas in, and spirit of Deng Xiaoping's speeches in Shenzhen in January.²⁸ Guangdong's press and local leaders were, in fact, fully mobilized during Deng's visit. Although Beijing had limited the number of "authorized" reporters who could follow Deng's tour from beginning to end (one from Xinhua, one from the Guangdong party paper, *Nanfang Ribao*, and three from the provincial TV station), when Deng appeared in Shenzhen, 50 or 60 cameras immediately began to click. These cameras belonged to provincial and city government personnel who accompanied Deng, and more important, personal secretaries of provincial leaders Xie Fei, Zhu Senlin, and Guo Rongchang used high-quality tape recorders to record Deng's remarks. ~~Governor Zhu's secretary was clever enough to "invite" Deng's daughter to record her father's voice.~~ The reason why leaders in Guangdong and Shenzhen were so enthusiastic about Deng's visit was revealed by a local reporter accompanying the tour: "In the past, Guangdong had always spoken less and done more in reform and opening up. It was much better for Deng to say it than for Guangdong to boast about itself."²⁹

The turning point in the public opinion battle came on February 21, 1992, when *Renmin Ribao* carried a commentator's article entitled "Earnestly Stop Formalism." During the next three days, the paper published an editorial article entitled "Better Uphold Economic Construction as the Center," an article signed by Fang Sheng on "Opening Up and the Use of Capitalism," and an editorial, "Be More Bold in Reform." These articles and editorials were carried simultaneously by newspapers throughout China's provinces, municipalities, and regions. The unprecedented media barrage signaled the success of Deng Xiaoping's strategy for winning "public opinion."

Successful Maneuvers at the Apex of the CCP Hierarchy

Deng Xiaoping's victory in the battle to win public support benefited greatly from his successful maneuvers at the top of the party hierarchy,

in the next 20, 30, or 50 years, or continue to do it always, more profound and bigger changes will take place in China. It (the line) should be stressed for 100 years."

28. See FBIS, *DR/CHI*, February 26, 1992, p. 20.

29. *Ta Kung Pao* (Hong Kong), April 2, 1992.

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which resulted in his critical remarks being relayed to party cadres at various levels through the Politburo meetings and collected in the *CCP Central Document, no. 2, 1992*. While Deng was touring the South, central leaders in Beijing were obviously busy, as their absence from public view suggests. During the two weeks following Chinese New Year (February 4-6), virtually no movements of frontline leaders were reported. Indeed, by the end of March, with the exception of Tian Jiyun who toured areas affected by drought, no leader had left Beijing on provincial inspection tours. This contrasts with nine inspection tours during the month following New Year 1991. After February 7, Jiang Zemin did not appear until the official visit of the prime minister of Kazakhstan on February 26.³⁰

Later reports revealed that Jiang Zemin and other Politburo members were called to Shanghai to see Deng Xiaoping during the spring festival.³¹ The inside story of Deng's maneuvers during these meetings with frontline leaders is not known, but events following the meetings demonstrated Deng's success in maneuvering at the apex of the formal party hierarchy. It was reported that a Politburo meeting was held on February 12 immediately after Jiang Zemin's return to Beijing. At this meeting, Jiang relayed Deng's instructions to the upper echelons, and afterwards Deng's remarks were orally passed on to cadres ranking at and above ministerial, provincial, and army levels. Members of the National People's Congress (NPC) Standing Committee and the Chinese People's National Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC) Standing Committee, who enjoy the same political privileges as cadres at the vice-ministerial level, also learned the contents of Deng's speeches.³²

While the response of the central bureaucrats to Deng's remarks was not clear, local leaders responded quickly and emphatically. Sources close to the Central Committee General Office revealed that, as of mid-February, the office had received letters or cables from some 1,800 party and government organs across the country expressing to Jiang Zemin their sincere support for Deng Xiaoping's call to increase the pace of reform and open-

30. *China News Analysis*, no. 1458 (April 15, 1992), p. 2.

31. The meeting was immediately reported by the Hong Kong media and confirmed a month later by Xinhua, which reported that "Senior Chinese leaders Deng Xiaoping, Yang Shangkun, Jiang Zemin, Wan Li, joined the Politburo members and vice premiers on an inspection tour of Shanghai's New Pudong Development Zone during this year's Spring festival" (Xinhua, March 10, 1992, in FBIS *DR/CHI*, 92-048, p. 15).

32. One newspaper reported that the Politburo meeting was attended by Politburo members; Central Committee members living in Beijing; persons in charge of the Central Advisory Commission, the Central Discipline Inspection Commission, and all ministries and departments under the State Council and the Central Committee; and provincial leaders (*Ming Pao*, March 7, 1992).

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Appendix V

《中国新闻周刊》：改革者乔石

积极响应邓小平南方谈话

1992年1月16日，乔石视察广东，并于1月20日至1月24日在珠海主持召开全国政法工作会议

对于这次会议该如何开、自己在会上应该谈些什么，他一直在思考。他让陈冀平找出改革开放以来邓小平的一系列讲话，仔细研究。他告诉陈冀平：“我这次的会议，还是要讲中国特色社会主义理论和改革开放的思想，不要简单地就政法工作谈政法工作，要把政法工作放在改革开放里头去谈。”

就在会议期间，1月18日至2月21日，邓小平视察南方，发表了改变中国改革进程的南方谈话。了解到讲话精神后，乔石兴奋地跟陈冀平说：“我这个会好开了！”

在讲话中，他谈到邓小平的谈话，提出：“必须认真学习和坚决贯彻邓小平同志的‘一手抓改革开放，一手抓打击经济犯罪’的指示。”

今年3月，兼任中共中央党校校长的乔石在党校开学典礼上发表了讲话。准备这次讲话时，他告诉陈冀平，南方谈话的精髓在于实事求是、一切从中国的实际出发，中央党校训也是实事求是。因此，党校的这次讲话我不讲别的，就讲实事求是”。

讲话中，他还专门谈了“左”和“右”问题，提出：“‘右’可以葬送社会主义，‘左’以葬送社会主义。要防止左的问题。”

其时，邓小平南方谈话尚未公开，道姓社姓资”的声音仍甚嚣尘上。在珠海的政法工作会议和中央党校开学典礼上，乔旗帜鲜明地呼应了邓小平南方谈话。后来小平评价乔石的党校讲话说：“很久没看么好的讲话了。”

“邓小平同志的田相 我认为乔石

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百度百科



Appendix VI

1月23日上午9时40分，小平同志乘坐轮船离开蛇口港，横越伶仃洋，向珠海驶去。

陪同的有其家属卓琳、邓琳、邓朴方、邓楠、邓榕以及王瑞林等在他身边工作的同志，广东陪同的有省委书记谢非，专程前来迎接的珠海市委书记、市长梁广大，省公安厅厅长陈绍基和陈开枝等，就这么几个人。整个航程约1小时10分钟，小平同志大概作了40分钟的谈话。

首先，省委书记谢非在小平同志面前摊开一张广东省地图，向他汇报广东改革开放和经济发展的情况。小平同志戴上老花镜，一边看地图，一边听汇报。

谢非书记说，广东按经济发展水平可以目录分为“三个世界”。“第一世界”是经济发展较快的珠江三角洲；“第二世界”是发展中等的粤东、粤西平原地区；“第三世界”是大片山区。广东正在努力缩小贫富地区的差距，

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Appendix VI

中国要在世界高科技领域占有一席之地1月
 23日上午11时许，小平同志抵达珠海经济
 特区，下榻于石景山庄。他在珠海市度过
 一个星期的时间，一连考察了几个高科技
 企业。

1月24日上午，小平同志乘车来到珠海生物
 化学制药厂。该厂厂长迟斌元在握着小平
 同志的手时说：“我们全厂职工盼望您来
 啊！您是中国改革开放的总设计师，我们
 能有今天，是您指引的结果。”小平同志摆
 摆手说：“过奖了”。在听取了“凝血酶”的研
 制生产和工厂发展等情况后，小平同志高
 兴地说：“我们应该有自己的拳头产品，创
 出我们自己的名牌，否则就会受人欺负
 这就要靠我们的科技工作者出把力，摆脱
 受人欺负的局面。”

1月25日上午，小平同志来到亚洲仿真系统
 工程公司。总经理游景玉介绍情况说，公

目录

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Appendix VI



百度百科



1月29日下午3时，小平同志告别珠海。汽

车在平坦的广珠公路上奔驰，小平同志望着生机勃勃的珠江三角洲，显得非常兴

奋。在参观完顺德容奇珠江冰箱厂后，下

午5时40分，汽车抵达广州火车站，受到

广东省、广州军区负责人的热烈鼓掌欢

迎。小平同志与大家在站台上合影留念，

并且同大家一一握手。6时整，小平同志踏

上视察上海的旅程。上海要抓住机遇扩大

开放

1992年1月29日晚，邓小平动身前往上海视

察。在与上海市党政领导见面时，老人

目录

告诫当时的上海市领导，“这是你们上海最


后一次机遇，这个机遇你们不要放过。”

邓小平南方谈话的内容要点



Appendix
VII

一九七一年一月一日



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Appendix VII

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1989年11月

界的发展中国家，没有民族自尊心，不珍惜自己民族的独立，国家是立不起来的。请你告诉布什总统：结束过去，美国应该采取主动，也只能由美国采取主动。美国是可以采取一些主动行动的，中国不可能主动。因为强的是美国，弱的是中国，受害的是中国。要中国来乞求，办不到。哪怕拖一百年，中国人也不会乞求取消制裁。如果中国不尊重自己，中国就站不住，国格没有了，关系太大了。国家关系应该遵守一个原则，就是不要干涉别国的内政。中华人民共和国决不会容许任何国家来干涉自己的内政。在谈到发展中美经贸关系时说：中美关系有一个好的基础，就是两国在发展经济、维护经济利益方面有相互帮助的作用。中国市场毕竟还没有充分开发出来，美国利用中国市场还有很多事情能够做。我们欢迎美国商人继续进行对华商业活动，这恐怕也是结束过去的一个重要内容。这个谈话的一部分已收入《邓小平文选》第三卷，题为《结束严峻的中美关系要由美国采取主动》。

11月4日 在驻地参加中共中央政治局常委扩大会议，并讲话。

11月5日 前往北京火车站迎接来华进行内部访问的朝鲜劳动党中央委员会总书记、国家主席金日成。六日上午，在同金日成举行会谈时说：这十年我们党把我放到了特殊的岗位，我不当党中央总书记，也不当国家主席，但实际上我是党和国家领导集体的核心，这在国际上也是公认的。我们第一代领导集体是毛泽东、刘少奇、周恩来、朱德，以后又包括陈云同志，包括我，那个时候还有林彪。这个领导集体的核心是毛主席。“文化大革命”中，党所以没有垮，就是因为有这个核心，就是

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1989年11月

11月6日—9日 中共十三届五中全会在北京举行。七日，邓小平致信中共中央政治局常委，向中央全会提议：江泽民任党中央军委主席，杨尚昆任党中央军委第一副主席，刘华清任党中央军委副主席，杨白冰任党中央军委秘书长；免去杨尚昆党中央军委秘书长职务；免去洪学智、刘华清党中央军委副秘书长职务。同日，中共中央政治局会议讨论通过这个提议。全会审议通过《关于同意邓小平同志辞去中共中央军事委员会主席职务的决定》和《关于调整中共中央军事委员会组成人员的决定》；决定由江泽民任中共中央军事委员会主席。全会高度评价邓小平对党和国家建立的卓著功勋。指出：邓小平同志是中国各族人民公认的享有崇高威望的杰出领导人，在党所领导的革命和建设的各个历史时期都做出了重大贡献。特别是中共十一届三中全会后，邓小平同志成为党的第二代领导集体的核心，领导中国人民在社会主义现代化建设中取得举世瞩目的成就；在社会主义新中国的历史上开创了一个新的时期。邓小平同志根据马克思列宁主义同中国实际相结合的原则提出的一系列观点和理论，特别是建设有中国特色的社会主义的基本理论，是毛泽东思想的重要组成部分，是毛泽东思想在新的历史条件下的继承和发展，是中国共产党和中国人民的宝贵精神财富。全会审议通过《中共中央关于进一步治理整顿和深化改革的决定》。

11月9日 会见出席中共十三届五中全会的全体同志。在谈话中说：感谢同志们的理解和支持，全会接受了我退休的请求。衷心地感谢全会，衷心地感谢同志们。

11月10日 上午，会见美国前国务卿亨利·基辛格。在回

Appendix VIII

Tiger on the Brink

**Jiang Zemin
and China's New Elite**

Bruce Gilley

UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA PRESS
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Appendix VIII

The Great Reconciliation

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concern for the farmers was mainly political; he had no peasant roots and had never been rusticated for ideological purification. But he staked out the issue early and made it his own. For that he would be commended.

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In his first two and a half years as party general secretary, Jiang was perhaps most notable for what he did *not* do. Unlike Hua Guofeng, with whom he was compared incessantly in the foreign media, Jiang did not try to assert his power over rivals in the Politburo or State Council in a way that would jeopardize his own position. In many ways, he was not in control at all; the propaganda apparatus, as we have seen, was firmly in the hands of the likes of Deng Liqun and Gao Di; the military was being run by the Yang brothers; and Li Peng, despite being embattled, continued to have a big say in economic policy:

Jiang *was* making inroads in all areas, though, gently injecting his authority into each field so far as he could without threatening those who controlled it. Touring the provinces also helped him win support within the Central Committee, whose members include most provincial governors and party chiefs. But to the extent that Jiang's authority grew, Deng's ferocious attacks on party conservatives were chiefly responsible. At this rate, it might have taken several years more for Jiang to wield any kind of decisive authority over the economy, the army, and the propaganda apparatus. But 1992 was to see Deng make a final assault on party conservatism that accelerated the process beyond all expectations.

In the early morning of 17 January 1992, an unmarked train pulled out from among the soot-encrusted platform billboards of Beijing's main train station. The green, eight-carriage train headed immediately south, along the line that cuts through the heart of the country and ends in the bustling city of Guangzhou at the head of the Pearl River Delta. Inside was the diminutive figure of Deng Xiaoping, peeking out from the lace curtains with a cup of green tea wobbling on the table in front of him. Along for the ride were two of his three daughters, Deng Rong and Deng Lin, as well as his wife, Zhuo Lin.¹⁴⁵ Other family members would join them later.

Roused by his successful crossing of swords with party conservatives throughout most of 1991, Deng had made an extraordinary decision in the depths of winter. Prior to his trip to Shanghai for the lunar new year in 1992, the 87-year-old retiree had decided to visit the booming south.

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His last glimpse of Guangdong province had been in 1984, just as the economic reforms he had engineered were switching into high gear. "I don't even recognize the place now," he would comment.

Although Deng's subsequent "southern tour" has been characterized as a desperate move by the patriarch to save his economic reforms from an onslaught of party conservatism, as we have seen, he was probably already winning that battle by the time he journeyed south. At the party plenum in November 1991, he had succeeded in overruling a proposal to give greater prominence to the struggle against Western influences. The reassertion of the paramountcy of economic development over all other concerns in the plenum communiqué was the concrete expression of Deng's assertion that the party should not overreact to events in the Soviet Union. "Deng has once again successfully foiled an attempt by conservative forces inside the party to change the basic line," *Jing bao* commented afterward. "People in Beijing believe that the political weather in China may warm up in 1992, and that there will be a strong atmosphere of reform and opening up."¹⁴⁶ It did not take long for the magazine to be proven right.

The southern tour was to be the culmination of Deng's assault on those afraid to release the controls on economic growth and change. His pent-up anger was obvious. He had the train make an unscheduled stop at Wuchang, half way to Guangzhou, on the morning of 18 January, and summoned the Hubei province governor and party chief to the station to hear him out. "I'll tell you what the problem is right now," he said. "Everyone is going through the motions, but nobody's doing any real good. Every time I turn on the TV, half the news is filled with meetings and ceremonies. A lot of our leaders have become television stars."¹⁴⁷

Deng was in a feisty mood. Those on board the train knew they could expect more of this in the south, and when the train pulled into Shenzhen at 9 A.M. on 19 January, they were not disappointed. "Some people have been fretting that using more foreign investment will mean more capitalism in China," Deng commented bumping along in a minivan with the Guangdong party chief, Xie Fei, after visiting the Huanggang border crossing with Hong Kong. "These people have no common sense. These firms make profits in accordance with our laws. And besides, we levy taxes, our workers are paid, and we learn new technology and management. What's wrong with that?"

Deng's message in various sermons delivered over the following ten days in Shenzhen and the other two SEZs in the province, Shekou and Zhuhai, was clearly aimed at setting off a new wave of economic

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growth. Stock markets in Shenzhen and Shanghai were good ideas, he said. The SEZs should continue to enjoy special policies. Guangdong should try to join the ranks of the "Asian tigers" by the year 2010. Deng even reiterated his "new cat theory" about the acceptability of market forces in a socialist system.

As for his critics in Beijing, Deng had a simple message: "China should maintain vigilance against the right, but we should mainly guard against the left," he said. "The view that reform and opening will bring capitalism and that peaceful evolution stems from economic development are leftist tendencies." Even Li Peng's "steady and coordinated" growth slogan came in for attack: "Steadiness and coordination are only relative, not absolute," Deng said. "Like a boat sailing against the current, we must forge ahead or be swept downstream."

Jiang had almost certainly been informed about Deng's trip before the patriarch's train chugged out of Beijing station. One official account says "key organs" knew about the trip, a phrase that would almost certainly have included Jiang, since he was mostly on Deng's side in the 1991 debates over economic reforms.¹⁴⁸ A few days before Deng left, Jiang called on officials in Shanghai to "accelerate reform and opening to the outside world" and "take new steps in deepening reforms," phrases that Deng himself would use on his tour.¹⁴⁹

Once Deng left Beijing, and despite himself being on the road touring Shanghai and Jiangsu, Jiang was in constant touch with his mentor's entourage. Two days after Deng's outburst in Wuchang on 18 January against meetings and ceremonies, for example, Jiang parroted to cadres in Jiangsu that they must "vigorously cut back nonessential meetings and reduce excessive routine public functions."¹⁵⁰ Jiang then had the party office prepare a document on reducing the "routine public functions" of state leaders so that they could concentrate more on making and implementing new economic policies.¹⁵¹

While he was in the south, Deng's anger was mostly vented on Li Peng. Jiang, by contrast, won mild praise. "The present central leadership has done a good job," Deng said. "Of course, there are still many problems, but problems exist at any time." Since it was already "a little advanced in years," Deng said, the current leadership should retire after another ten years in power. That would give Jiang the right to rule China until the party's sixteenth congress in 2002.

When Jiang got back to Beijing in late January, the southern tour had just concluded. Deng was in Shanghai to usher in the year of the monkey, and Jiang made a publicized telephone call to the patriarch to wish

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him well.¹⁵² By then, Deng's southern tour, also known as the "spring-time story," was an open secret in China. But no official reports had been carried in the domestic press. Jiang suddenly found himself faced with the tricky task of overcoming conservatives in the propaganda apparatus to have Deng's speeches reported in the national press. It would take forty days before the official Xinhua News Agency reported the tour.

Certainly, the delay had nothing to do with Deng's desire to keep a low profile. Xie Fei asked Deng several times during the tour to allow him to reveal the trip, which was being reported in Hong Kong within days of Deng's arrival in Shenzhen.¹⁵³ The official line was that Deng refused.¹⁵⁴ But although he may modestly have declined widespread media coverage while in Guangdong, Deng certainly intended that his words should echo farther than the precincts of the amusement parks and joint venture factories he visited in the province. Instead, reliable reports put the blame squarely on the conservatives in charge of the propaganda system, one of the areas, as we have seen, where Jiang had little control as yet.¹⁵⁵ *People's Daily* and Xinhua remained under the firm control of Xu Weicheng at the party's Propaganda Department.

Jiang obviously decided that his best hope of getting at the belly of the prickly propaganda system was, so to speak, to tickle its nose. In a new year's address, Jiang surprised those gathered by quoting from Deng, without reference, in calling on cadres to "make bold explorations" and "accelerate reforms."¹⁵⁶ A week later, at an enlarged Politburo meeting, Jiang circulated a compilation of Deng's speeches.¹⁵⁷ Within days, the speeches were sent down the line to the army and local party branches. By the end of February, anyone with a friend of even modest rank in a local party cell had access to the new gospel. "We passed on the contents of Deng's speeches to the whole party and to the whole country at an early stage," Jiang would later admit, chuffed by the success of his artifice.¹⁵⁸ Television stations and newspapers duly began to shift their emphasis toward the new "wave" of economic reform, but stopped short of linking this to Deng's still unreported tour. Pressure for a full public disclosure of the trip grew.

The break finally came at a Politburo meeting in early March. Jiang began the meeting by summing up Deng's speeches.¹⁵⁹ He then took a remarkable step by offering a self-criticism. "He admitted a lack of sensitivity in seizing opportunities to promote reform and opening as well as a lack of forcefulness in opposing leftist tendencies," *Jing bao* reported.¹⁶⁰ Jiang's action was canny. If he had bragged at the meeting about how he had supported Deng from the start—which he could jus-

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tifiably have claimed—it might have alienated many. But by offering himself as the chief leftist, a label no one would seriously consider accepting, Jiang encouraged others to join in admitting the error of suppressing the speeches. A beaten Li Peng, just back from a trip to Europe dogged by protests, offered no objection to the resolution to endorse Deng's speeches wholeheartedly. In a symbolic act, Yao Yilin, the 74-year-old conservative economic planner who had helped Li Peng draft his slow-growth five-year plan, submitted his retirement from all posts at the Politburo meeting.¹⁶¹ It was accepted and made official later in the year.

When the belated Xinhua report was issued on 11 March, it was the end of the long propaganda struggle. Millions of Chinese woke up to a single sentence that began the next morning's radio broadcast: "We should be more daring in opening and reform."¹⁶² Deng's springtime story was official.

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Under the influence of Deng's southern tour, China's economy erupted in a spasm of growth. Economic growth and foreign investment inflow had picked up modestly in 1991 after a painful three-year retrenchment. Growth was already above Li Peng's conservative target of 6 percent, a target given a symbolic upward revision to 6.5 percent at the annual parliament gathering in late March 1992. But by midyear, Chinese economists estimated it was in double digits. The final numbers surprised everyone: growth was 13 percent for all of 1992, while foreign investment rose by 66 percent, to U.S.\$19 billion. Most of the growth was initiated by local governments. Deng's talks and the symbolic upward revision of the growth rate gave them a green light for new projects. Pleased with himself, Deng even reemerged in late May to pay a visit to the Capital Iron and Steel Company in Beijing. State enterprises took the cue and invested heavily.

In speech after speech throughout 1992, Jiang reiterated Deng's points. At the end of May, he wrote to the entire Politburo asking them to be more enthusiastic about Deng's speeches. Local governments, meanwhile, should strive for "relatively high economic growth."¹⁶³ Most conspicuously, in early June, Jiang marched right into the heart of party conservatism—the Central Party School in Beijing—and told graduates that any cadre tinkering with Deng's policies "could be sacked at any time."¹⁶⁴

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贾庆林

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Appendix IX

贾庆林

中央政府门户网站 www.gov.cn 2007年10月24日 来源: 新华社

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贾庆林同志像 新华社发

贾庆林，男，汉族，1940年3月生，河北泊头人，1959年12月加入中国共产党，1962年10月参加工作，河北工学院电力系电机电器设计与制造专业毕业，大学学历，高级工程师。

现任中共中央政治局常委，十一届全国政协主席。

1956—1958年 石家庄工业管理学校工业企业计划专业学习

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贾庆林

Appendix A

- 1958—1962年 河北工学院电力系电机电器设计与制造专业学习
- 1962—1969年 一机部设备成套总局技术员、团委副书记
- 1969—1971年 下放一机部江西奉新“五七”干校劳动
- 1971—1973年 一机部办公厅政策研究室技术员
- 1973—1978年 一机部产品管理局负责人
- 1978—1983年 中国机械设备进出口总公司总经理
- 1983—1985年 山西太原重型机器厂厂长、党委书记
- 1985—1986年 福建省常委、副书记
- 1986—1988年 福建省委副书记兼省委组织部部长
- 1988—1990年 福建省委副书记兼省委党校校长、省直机关工委书记
- 1990—1991年 福建省委副书记、代省长
- 1991—1993年 福建省委副书记、省长
- 1993—1994年 福建省委书记、省长
- 1994—1996年 福建省委书记、省人大常委会主任
- 1996—1997年 北京市委副书记、代市长、市长
- 1997—1999年 中央政治局委员，北京市委书记、市长
- 1999—2002年 中央政治局委员，北京市委书记
- 2002—2003年 中央政治局常委
- 2003—2008年 中央政治局常委，十届全国政协主席、党组书记
- 2008— 中央政治局常委，十一届全国政协主席

中共第十四届、十五届、十六届、十七届中央委员，十五届中央政治局委员，十六届、十七届中央政治局委员、常委。第十届、十一届全国政协主席。

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Appendix X



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陈光毅

编辑 上传视频

福建省原书记

陈光毅，男，1933年8月生，福建莆田人，1959年加入中国共产党，1953年8月参加工作，毕业于东北工学院机电系。

曾任甘肃省省长、福建省委书记、民航总局局长，第九届全国人民代表大会财经委员会主任委员、第十届全国人民代表大会华侨委员会主任委员。

中文名	陈光毅	出生地	福建莆田
性别	男	出生日期	1933年8月
国籍	中国	毕业院校	东北工学院（现东北大学）
民族	汉族	政治面貌	中共党员



陈光毅的概念图 (1张)

- 1 人物履历
- 2 担任职务

人物履历

1950-1953年在东北工学院机电系学习。

毕业后在甘肃省白银市历任技术员、工程师、设计总负责人、甘肃省重工业厅副处长、西北有色冶金设计院生产办公室主任、甘肃省冶金局局长、甘肃省计委副主任。

1983年，任中共甘肃省委副书记、甘肃省省长。

1986-1993年，任中共福建省委书记、省军区党委第一书记。

1988年1月，福建省政协六届一次会议上当选福建省六届政协主席。

1993年1月，福建省第八届人民代表大会第一次会议选举陈光毅为福建省人大常委会主任。

1993年12月-1998年6月，任中国民用航空总局局长。

1994年5月，任南京航空航天大学民航学院名誉董事长。

1998年3月，当选第九届全国人民代表大会财经委员会主任委员。

2003年3月，当选第十届全国人民代表大会华侨委员会主任委员。

担任职务

中共第十二、十三、十四、十五届中央委员，第九届全国人民代表大会常务委员。

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