In Dorchester gun case, court rules police can keep informant information secret if it might lead to the informant's identification

The Supreme Judicial Court concluded today that a judge erred in ordering Boston Police to hand over information about an informant in a gun case because even if his name were redacted, the information could provide enough clues for the defendant - or somebody else - to figure out who he is.

The ruling comes in the case of a woman facing charges for the rifle, shotgun and shells police say they found in her apartment at 6 Michigan Ave. in Dorchester in April, 2019, after getting a search warrant based on an interview with an informant who claimed to have seen the guns in her apartment.

Shamia Whitfield's attorney requested a Boston Municipal Court judge order BPD to provide background on the informant's past payments by BPD and information about the court cases in which his information led to arrests, in an attempt, the attorney said, to see just how trustworthy his information was, since the warrant based on his statements lacked any proof of his "reliability, credibility, and veracity."

A Boston Municipal Court judge agreed, but the state's highest court said today: Nope.

The SJC started by saying informant information can usually be kept as a closely guarded secret by police - in the Boston Police Department, "cards" with information information do not even list their names - and that lawyers have to make good cases to be shown information about them.

In this case, BPD had a good reason to keep the informant information secret - a fear that revealing anything about him could lead to his identification, in part because of his involvement in other cases - the court said. And the lawyer failed to make a good case for obtaining more information, the court ruled.

[B]ased on the record before us, we conclude that the extensive amount of information requested by the defendant would, in effect, reveal the informant's identity such that the informant's privilege is applicable to this case.

Here, the search warrant issued to search the defendant's home and person relied on the informant's assertions that the informant had seen the defendant load and unload firearms inside her home within the thirty days prior to the application for the warrant. The expansive nature of the ordered discovery would risk providing details that would allow the defendant, or others familiar with her home, to retrace their activities over the preceding thirty days and discern the identity of the informant on that basis. ... Moreover, the informant has provided information leading to the arrest of three other individuals for firearms offenses, the execution of a search warrant that located firearms and drugs, and the arrest of one person on a default warrant. The disclosure of the details of those events -- their dates, locations, and the names of the involved parties -- would permit those familiar with the informant to piece together a detailed picture of the informant's assistance to law enforcement, effectively identifying the informant.

And the lawyer failed to provide enough evidence that the informant might not be untrustworthy, the court continued.

However, "[m]ere suspicion that there was no informant, or that the informant's 'reliability' credentials have been misstated, or that his information was other than as recited by the affiant," as was the case here, does not rise to the level of an articulated challenge that warrants a [hearing to contest information used in the search warrant].

The court added:

Finally, the brief, vague, and conclusory assertion in defense counsel's affidavit that the requested information was "needed to prepare for trial" does not pass muster for a showing of materiality. A judge "cannot be required to assess the need for disclosure . . . without some guidance" as to the "scheme of the defense." ... Although the defendant's burden at this stage is "relatively undemanding," see Bonnett, 472 Mass. at 847, it was not met here, and the motion judge abused her discretion in concluding otherwise when faced with this evidentiary record.